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HARMONIZATION OF ANTITRUST AND ANTIDUMPING
LAWS: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CREATIVE
EXPERIMENTATION IN THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AREA
HARVEY M. APPLEBAUM*
When the United States and Canada commenced the negotiations of
a Free Trade Agreement in 1988, it was the objectives of the Canadian
government that the antidumping and countervailing duty laws should
not apply within the free trade area. That objective was not accomplished;
and as a compromise, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement created
special bi-national panels to review antidumping and countervailing decisions in lieu of the judicial regimes of the two respective countries.,2
That special bi-national panel system was continued in the NAFTA.
There was again some early discussion on the part of both Canada and
Mexico about removing the trade laws from the NAFTA agreement but
the United States again, resisted and so we have again the bi-national
panels. However, the NAFTA parties did create three working groups.
They created a working group on subsidies and countervailing duties, a
working group on dumping and antidumping duties, and most interestingly, a working group on the relationship of the competition and trade
laws.
Professor Fox's article3 describes the differences in the objectives of
the trade laws and the antitrust laws. I will not repeat that material.
But, I would like to emphasize how, in the United States those differences
play out in practice.
The policies of the two sets of laws come from very different sources
in the United States. The trade laws reflect the policy objectives established
by the President, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the International Trade Administration of the Commerce Department and the
U.S. Congress. Antitrust law, on the other hand, reflects very different
policies developed by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice,
which of course is part of the executive branch, the Federal Trade
Commission which is an entirely independent agency, and private parties.
Ninety percent of antitrust suits in the United States are filed by private
parties. Those parties have their own policy objectives and often establish
policy when they are seeking damages for their own purposes in the

* Partner, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.
1. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, CH. 19, 27 I.L.M. 281, 386
(1988).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Ch. 19 U.S.-Can.-Mex., (effective
Jan. 1, 1994) 107 Stat. 2057 [hereinafter NAFTA]32 I.L.M. 605, 682 (1993).
3. See Fox. The Antitrust Laws of the United States and Ley de Competencia of Mexico: A

Comparative Review, 1992-1994, in this Journal.

U.S. -MEXICO

LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

form of Supreme Court decisions. The state antitrust laws are also very
important, because there is considerable state antitrust enforcement in
the United States.
The different origins of the two sets of laws dictate different procedures
and even different forums of judicial review. The strict rules of adjudication and due process which regulate the enforcement of the antitrust
laws do not apply to the same degree to the enforcement of the trade
laws.
The trade laws are not generally subject to the Administrative Procedure
Act (A.D.A.), whereas antitrust enforcement by the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission are restricted by the A.P.A. and
enforcement by the Department of Justice and private suits are governed
by the full due process requirements of the federal courts.
There is very little opportunity for the Judiciary to consider anything
in common about the two sets of laws, unless a case reaches the Supreme
Court (and only one trade law case has reached the Supreme Court since
World War II).1 Appeals of administrative decisions in trade law cases
are made, first, to the U.S. Court of International Trade in New York
City, and appeals from that Court's decisions are made to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Washington, D.C. Judicial review
of antitrust cases goes through the regular U.S. Courts of Appeals.
Another important difference between the two sets of laws is in the
relief and remedies they provide. Trade law remedies generally involve
either increased or special duties or quotas. Antitrust relief can include
damages, injunctions and divestiture or restructuring.
The most striking dissimilarity exhibited by the two sets of laws occurs
in their differences, which is consistent with the differences in their
objectives. The antitrust laws require a finding that there has been an
unreasonable restraint of trade or a substantial lessening of competition.
The trade laws, however, generally require only a showing that the unfair
trade practice contributed to or had some significant role to play in
creating material injury to a domestic industry. "Material injury" is
defined by the Congress as anything more than de minimus or immaterial
injury.' The other trade laws described in my outline similarly are quite
different from the antitrust laws. The manner in which "markets" are
defined, the way causation is determined, and the standing requirements,
are quite different. Consistent with the concept that the trade laws are

4. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978).
5. The International Trade Commission has jurisdiction to determine "whether .
in the United States . . . is threatened with material injury, or ...

an industry

the establishment of an industry

in the United States is materially retarded, by reason of imports" of merchandise which is subsidized
or by reason of sales at less than fair value (dumping). Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b)
and 1673d(b) (1994). The Act provides that "In general. The term 'material injury' means harm
which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (1994). In
determining the impact on domestic industry, the Commission is required to "evaluate all relevant
economic factors which have a bearing on the state of the industry in the United States, including,

but not limited to," an extensive list of actual and potential economic factors. 19 U.S.C. §1677(7)(C)(iii)
(1994).

19961

HARMONIZATION OF LAWS

intended to protect industries, producers and workers in contrast to
antitrust law protection of the competitive process and consumer welfare,
the required showing of injury in an antidumping or countervailing duty
case is substantially less than what is required in an antitrust case, whether
a government case or a private suit.
The concept of "price discrimination" is intertwined with both the
U.S. antidumping laws and the U.S. Antitrust laws. Where a foreign
company sells merchandise "at less then fair value" (this is determined
by comparing the price - "normal value" - at which the product is sold
in the home market with the price - "export price"

- at which the

product is sold in the United States) implies either price discrimination
or an unfair practice. Two of the U.S. antitrust laws involve similar
concepts, the Robinson-Patman Act and Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discrimination between competing sellers when there is injury to competition. 6 In the context of the
Robinson-Patman Act, predatory pricing concerns primary line injury,
that is, injury at the level of the seller and not injury at the level of
the customer (secondary line injury). Section 2 of the Sherman Act
prohibits attempts to monopolize through the use of predatory practices. 7
How do you define pricing which should be considered injurious? Low
prices generally benefit consumers, and the competitive process (if it
works) is intended to maximize price competition as well as other elements
of competition. In a garden-variety antidumping case which simply compares the price in the foreign market to the price in the United States,
there is not even a requirement cost be considered. There is dumping
under the U.S. law and Canadian and other similar laws if the price in
the foreign market is higher than the price in the United States, even
if both prices are profitable. On this premise that there is obviously no
concept of predation. There can thus be two profitable prices - one in
the foreign market, and one in the United States or Canada or Mexico
and the seller is still dumping.
When cost does becomes involved in antidumping cases, the Commerce
Department has consistently defined cost as total, fully allocated cost
and seeks to determine whether the price under examination in the home
market is below that total cost. In Contrast, it is well established under
U.S. antitrust law that in order to consider a price to be predatory it
has to be below average variable cost or marginal cost." This is a very
major difference. It is now clear, from a recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court in the Brooke Group case9 that in order to prosecute
a predatory pricing case under Section 2 of the Sherman Act or the

6. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1994).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
8. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco, Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). See

also Henry v. Chloride, 809 F.2d 1334 (8th Cir. 1987); 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d
340, 348- 350 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
104 F.T.C. 280 (1984).
9. Id.

1125 (1982);

and ITT Continental Baking,
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Robinson-Patman Act, the plaintiff must not only show below cost pricing,
but also that the seller had a reasonable prospect of recoupment. This
requires a showing that, after the seller lowered the price below cost,
and injured or knocked competitors out of the market, prices could be
raised and the lost profits due to the low prices could be recouped. I
believe there is very rarely, if ever, an antidumping case which results
in an order that could survive those antitrust requirements.
How did the ABA Antitrust Section Task Force came out on this
issue? The Task Force recommended that, at least in a free trade zone
like the NAFTA, the most compatible approachwould be to.replace the
antidumping laws with the antitrust laws.' 0 A genuine free trade zone
assumes the elimination of trade barriers, national treatment and the
absence of differential prices. The substitute reliance would be on the
Sherma

Act andRn o

aAct predatory pricing principles. The

Robinson-Patman Act would clearly have to be amended because it
currently does not apply to sales outside the United States. In order to
compare sales in Canada or Mexico with a sale in the United States, it
would be necessary to amend the Act. There is no question but that
such a change would reduce the protection of domestic industries from
import competition in the three NAFTA countries but the principle is
that, in a free trade area that is something that should not be of undue
concern.. The Task Force decided there was no need to have a common
legal standard for the separate antitrust regimes of the three countries,
but there should through the NAFTA working group to consideration
of convergence.
The United States is not going to repeal its antidumping law, at least
in the near future. Therefore, the more interesting and more realistic
part of the Task Force Report is the proposal to consider about phasing
in, converging, harmonizing, whatever one wants to call it, the antidumping and antitrust law concepts. One can consider the lower standards
of injury and causation in antidumping cases and consider whether in
NAFTA cases they should be upgraded. One can take a different look
at standing issues in the NAFTA context. One can consider introducing
the "meeting competition" defense which is now not available under the
antidumping law. Most importantly, one can consider incorporating the
concept of predatory below cost pricing as it has developed in the antitrust
laws into the Commerce Department's consideration of cost in antidumping cases. one can also consider whether downstream consumer
effects could reasonably be taken into account. It is not unusual for an
industry to bring an antidumping case with a good case of injury from
low-priced imports, but the consumers of the product claiming that it
is going to hurt them badly. The consumers may claim that the U.S.
industry is not capable of fully meeting their needs or requirements in

10. Antitrust Section, American Bar Association, Task Force Report on the Competition Di-

mensions of NAFTA (1994). The ABA Task Force Report does not suggest or deal with a substitution
of antitrust laws for anti-dumping laws outside of the NAFTA free trade area.
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certain niche areas. The ABA Task Force Report raises the question
whether it would be worthwhile to consider the idea of trying to converge
the two bodies of laws, and considering the downstream consumer effect
in the NAFTA context.
The ABA Task Force thus recommended consideration of an approach
that would retain the two sets of laws, but blending antitrust type concepts
into the antidumping law. This does not mean that there would necessarily
be the same results under either law. The objectives of the laws would
remain the same; the antidumping law would still be primarily intended
to protect U.S. industries or Canadian industries or Mexican industries
from unfair low priced competition ("dumping") and the antitrust laws
would still be primarily intended to protect the competitive process. What
does one then do about private damage actions? Private damage actions
in the United States would cause a problem for every approach the Task
Force considered.
I should mention that the Task Force considered two other options
which were considered less desirable. One was expanded use of the socalled "safeguard escape clause remedy."" t This would mean more effective use of that statute to provide temporary relief from import competition without regard to whether such competition is unfair or based
on price. Finally, the Task Force considered the idea of improving the
U.S. antidumping law through procedural and definitional changes, some
of which were achieved in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. 2
So, has anything really changed? I've been writing on the interface of
the antitrust and the trade laws for longer than I would like to admit.
But, today, this has become a common topic. The NAFTA Task Force
has become a NAFTA tri-national task force of the ABA, Canadian and
Mexican bar associations which is continuing to consider this subject.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the
World Trade Organization are both considering both the harmonization
of competition laws and the trade law-competition law overlap. The ABA
has even created yet another task force, this time a combined task force
of the Antitrust and International Law Sections dealing with the relationship of the antitrust laws and the trade laws. I am therefore encouraged
that whatever one's view of whether the NAFTA Task Force report is
the right direction or some other approach, the problem is being addressed.
In terms of opportunity, the NAFTA clearly offers the best pathway to
trying to do something about these two bodies of laws, particularly in
the interface of the antidumping and antitrust laws.

II. Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat. §201 (1978), 19 U.S.C. §2251 (1994).
12. GATT Secretariat, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations (April 15, 1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1143 [hereinafter Final Act]; implemented
by U.S. Congress in Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465 (Dec. 8, 1994), 19 U.S.C.A.
§§ 3501-3624 (1996 Supp.).

